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Introduction 
Traditionally costs have played an important role 
in town planning appeals - representing the means of 
discouraging' unfair and unnecessary litigation, and 
controlling each step in the conduct of the case. By 
1. 
a judicial application, the problems of prolixity and 
delay in proceedings, and more pertinently the taking 
of appeals as a matter of course, can be prevented. 
However a delicate balance must be struck between the 
reasonable application of costs to prevent abuse of the 
system and overly stringent awards that actively dis-
courage the initiation of appeals. Under the latter 
regime, even the most prudent and justified of litigants 
will be reluctant to hazard an appeal. 
After recently reviewing the costs question, the 
Planning Tribunal issued a new practice note on 19 June 
1979, effectively superseding the earlier costs' practice. 
Variously interpreted as indicating a movement away 
from the previous practice 1 , and a hardening of attitude 
by the Tribunal towards unsuccessful appellants 2 (although 
observing in the latter that the Tribunal had not gone to 
the extent of say ing costs will normally follow the event), 
the step does a p pear to significantly alter the general 
practice regarding cost awards in the sphere of planning 
appeals. As a general rule, the Tribuna l will now award 
costs against a ny appe llant invoking the appellate procedure 
unless the appe llant succee ds in obtaining either (a) the 
relief sought by the appeal, or (b) a substantial modification 
of the de cision appealed agai~st. 3 
Alone, this bald statement of approach indicates the 
Tribunal's adoption of an intransigent stance towards planning 
appellants. Justified by the admirable d esire to prevent 
the lodging of perverse and frivolous appeals as a delaying 
tactic, the practical conseque nce may well b e to stifle and 
/ unduly 
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2. 
unduly restrict even bona fide appellants from participa-
tion in the planning process. 
The Remarkables Protection Committee v Mount Cook 
Group decision reflects the disquiet ing application of 
the Planning Triounal's current practice note regarding 
costs. By its substantial award mulcting the Protection 
Committee in costs, the Tribunal's decision reflects, in 
practice, a deterrent regime. A severe financial obstacle 
has been placed before any planning appellant, and partic-
ularly so before environmental appellants, who act in the 
public interest and traditionally have been plagued by 
insufficient financial support. 
The principal object of this paper is to consider the 
role of costs in planning appeals and the extent to which 
the Remarkables decision, read concomitant with the practice 
note, has effected a watershed and a gravitation away from 
previous costs practice. 
I COST AWARD PRECEDENTS 
Town and Coun try Planning Act 1977 
Under section 147 of the Town and Country Planning 
Act 1977 5 th e Planning Tribunal has a two-fold discretion 
to award costs. Subsection one deals with cost awards at 
the appellate level, where. costs as the Tribunal "considers 
reasonable II may be awarded, and such costs may be apportioned 
"in such manner as it thinks fit 11 • This provision is 
coupled with a power in subsection two to award costs •.vhere 
a party defaults, either by failure to prosecute any pro-
ceeding at the fixed hearing time, or failure to give adequate 
notice of the abandonment of any proceeding. 6 
/ Althougn 
Although not mirroring the power of the former 
Boards under section 40(6) of the 1953 Act - a power 
to award "such costs as it deems just", this discretion 
3. 
is considerea to be unaltered, the linguistic distinctions 
. h . ub 7 not representing any c ange ins stance. 
As a general rule, the Tribunal (formerly Town 
Planning Boards) did not award costs (costs lay where 
they fell) unless acts constituting misconduct and placing 
an increased burden of costs on the other party occurred. 8 
Hence costs have been awarded where the appeal was unjust-
ifiably adjourned, 9 where the appellant raised a ground of 
appeal not taken before the counci1, 10 or was found to have 
no right of appeal, 11 and in the instance of a last minute 
application for its withdrawai. 12 In this light, the current 
practice note reflects an unprecedented step, and a marked 
gravitation away from the earlier practice. 
Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 
Under the Water c'.fod Soil Conservation Act, the Tribunal's 
position is somewhat different. In considering an appeal 
against the costs order of a Regional Water Board, it has 
jurisdiction both to review that award and to determine 
13 whether costs should also be allowed on appeal. Regarding 
appellate costs, section 25(2) prescribes a discretion either 
to leave costs where they fall, or to direct upon whom they 
shall be borne. 14 
Under this legislation, costs have been awarded both 
against an appellant who, putting the applicant for water 
rights to proof, did not himself call evidence, 15 and also 
to a successful appellant, despite an absence of the 
proper conduct on the local authority's behalf. 16 This 
latter award was justified since the appeal represented the 
necessary and only means for the appellants to defend their 
proprietary rights. 
4 • 
By a subtle and gradual circumscription of the 
general rule, what may be termed a hardening of approach by 
the Planning,Tribunal toward appellants under both Acts has 
occurred. Where no new question of principle arises on 
appeal, and the principles relevant to the grant 
of rights are well settled, a cost award against the appellant 
is likely.
17 
However, where the issues are of much wider 
import than those usually applying in a water rights applica-
tion, costs will not be awarded against the unsuccessful 
appellent.
18 
For the future, where an appeal involving 
essentially a value judgment is unsuccessful, costs will be 
awarded against the appellant. 19 
Why this anathema against unsucce_ssful appeals involving 
value judgments? Surely such appeals are not a sub-class 
within a broader context of appeals - all planning appeals 
raising subjective issues, by their nature dictating value 
judgments in their resolution. 
The Planning Tribunal has explicitly recognised the 
intrinsic nature of its determinations as involving value 
. d t 2 O ,.n... . . . 1 . JU gmen s. 'vrny 1 t tnen goes on to ra1_ against re-p resen-
tation of such value judgements at b1e appellate level is 
unclear, although it has been suggested that such a rule may 
be no more than a restatement, in a different way of the 
general rule that costs should follow the event . 21 Since 
the matters raised are by nature subjective, and not black 
and white, and equally their resolution not reflecting the 
straight forward and objective application of established 
legal principles, therefore the consequences attendant upon 
that determination should not be black and white . 
Subjective considerations dictate an individual cost 
award, specific to the facts of each case. An environmental 
planning appellant emerges at the polar extreme of an 
ordinary civil litigant. Propounding essentially the 
/ intangible 
5 . 
intangible - the maintenance of environmental quality, 
the environmental appellant pursues a particularly unselfish 
case, with no hint of self interest motivation (acting in 
the public interest and generally without any proprietary, 
personal or financial rights to protect). Equally, the 
subject matter is not readily quantifiable in terms of 
immediate benefit (an environmental appeal, essentially 
a preventative measure, to maintain the status quo), and 
it possesses no apparent financial value. Balancing the 
competing interests, in a quasi-judicial sphere whose decisions 
are marked by pragmatic, rather than legal and precedence 
response, dictates a value judgement. 
~ In sharp contrast, the ordinary civil litigant, and 
most pointedly in former personal injury actions, is motivated 
by the purely self interested desire to protect a personal 
or proprietary right. In general, a tangible right is 
propounded, a financial value is readi ly assignable, and the 
relief sought is characterised by monetary gain or recompense. 
A planning appeal is thus distinctive in nature, and 
inherently imbued with these subjective issues. The general 
immutable rule that an unsuccessful appellant must pay costs 
takes no account of such considerations that require an 
individual cost award, specific to the particular facts of 
each case. 
This developing rigidity is of general purport, increas -
ingly subjecting all unsuccessful appellants to costs liability~ 2 
Its effect however being particularly damning for environ-
mental appellants, hampered by insufficient financial resources 
in presenting the appeal, and the nature of t he remedy sought 
(variously mandamus, declaratory judgment , and injunction) 
providing no possibility of financial ~ecompense. 
Administrative Analogy? 
The Commission of Inquiry, essentially an administrative 
/ parallel 
6. 
parallel of the Planning Tribuna1 23 equally invokes cost 
awards. Under the Salmon Report, 24 the Commission's 
object being "to inquire and report" and never to penalise, . 
the necessary corollary arises that cost awards must there-
fore be remunerative, and not to penalise. 
The costs analogy that Tribunal awards should not be 
punitive, although undeniably beneficial and of practical 
appeal in the environmental context, is not readily drawn 
because of the fundamental distinctions between the two 
bodies. A Commission requires special instigation (usually 
at the behest of Parliament) inquiring into and reporting 
on the specific issue prompting its instigation. By 
comparison, the Planning Tribunal is C\f permanent constitution, 
hearing many and varied appeals, and a~tually deciding the 
issues raised. Cost awards at an inquiry in the public 
interest are essentially remunerative, rewarding a witness 
and his counsel for assisting the Commission; in planning 
appeals, costs clearly play a more definitive role, with 
purely remunerative cost awards often inappropriate. However, 
rather than being essentially punitive in nature, the partial 
adoption of a remunerative-oriented stance in cost awards 
is desirable. The presentation of environmental factors 
greatly assists the Tribunal in its resolution of the matter. 
By ensuring the adequate canvass both of the deleterious 
consequences of the proposed d e velopment , and/or the 
desirability of maintaining the status quo, environmental 
appellants provide an effective and necessary counterbalance 
to the not unnatural bias of the development case. 
In this light, an environmental appellant's failure 
should not draw the automatic sanction of costs - win or 
lose, the canvassing of environmental factors nevertheless 
assisting the Tribunal's resolution. Thus Tribunal awards 
should reflect some remunerative element, a recognition of 
the beneficial role of environmental appellants in the 
planning process. 
/ Overseas Survey 
7 • 
Overseas Survey 
Overseas' costs practice in planning is instructive. 
Largely developed from its English counterpart, New Zealand's 
legislation has however incorporated much of the philosophy 
and practice of the United States, and hence reflects a 
compromise between two polar systems. The Australian 
experience also ~ay evidence a similarity in approach. ~ 
(i) United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom planning structure has been charac-
terised as a system" ... marked by its centralised control 
over location, its undivisable administrative review and its 
flexibility 11 • 25 Objections are raised initially at the local 
planning authority level, with a right of appeal to an 
independent tribunai. 26 Decision making . at both levels is 
subject to the scrutiny and final adjudication of the Secretary 
of State. 27 A consideration of appeals against local authority 
decisions, heard by inspectors appointed from central government 
and usually decided on the parties' written submissions, has 
prompted the comment that although the planning legislation 
provides for the establishment of an independent ad hoe 
tribunal, an administrative decision is generally favoured~ 8 
Cost awards both at the local inquiry and appellate level 
are discretionary, under section 250(5) Local Government Act 
1972 (as applied to the Town and Country Planning Act 1971). 
Under a Ministry Circular 29 however, this discretionary power 
has been supplanted by the general rule that costs will not 
usually be awarded except ag~inst a party behaving unreasonably, 
vexatiously or frivolously. The Circular's main criterion 
of unreasonable behaviour is whether one party has been put 
to unnecessary and unreasonable expense , either because the 
matter should never have come to inquiry or where the conduct 
of one party caused undue trouble and expe ns e . The Circular 
also exacts a higher standard of behaviour from planning 
/ authorities 
authorities, since they ought to know more about the 
procedure and the strength of the argument on both sides 
of the appeal. 
The position of environmental groups in the planning 
process is somewhat precarious. In many instances having 
/ 
no positive legal right to be heard at public inquiries, 
8. 
their representation is solely dependent upon the Inspector's 
discretion. Recent speculation and controversy over third 
party representation at planning appeals has generated the 
comment that the effectiveness of planning appeals would be 
enhanced with third party representation, by ensuring the 
production of all requisite information at the appeal, and 
assisting the ultimate decision and conduct of the Secretary 
of State (or his delegates). 30 
(ii) United States 
In direct contrast, the United States' system is " ... 
marked by local autonomy, judicial review and rigidity 11 •
31 
The American. Rule that costs lie where they fall, prevails 
at both the administrative agency (equating with the Planning 
Tribunal) and judicial (Court litigatiori levels in environmental 
actions. Diverse views have been expressed as to the validity 
and application of the American Rule, particularly at the 
. d' . 1 32 d' . 133 d 34 . h JU 1c1a stage. Ju 1c1a an statutory exceptions ave 
been developed to lessen the stringency of this costs rule. 
Environmental litigants, in the absence of specific 
statutory authorisation of an award, have sought particularly 
to invoke the private attorney general exception. This 
exception applied to actions vindicating fundamental Congress-
ional policies, creating a widespread benefit and yet involving 
a heavy financial burden far outweighing any potential benefit 
to the individual litigant. 
Cognisant of the fact that most en\·ironmental and public 
/ interest 
9 • 
interest litigants advanced a conservationist goal on 
behalf of the public, usually claiming specific relief, 
federal courts, broadening its application, began awarding 
' 
fees in an increasing number of environmental suits. The 
United States Supreme Court effectively stymied this devel-
opment however, by refusing to extend the private attorney 
general doctrine to environmental litigation, and deferred 
35 such a step to Congress. 
Consequently the position regarding cost awards in 
environmental actions remains essentially unaltered - costs 
lie where they fall. 
( iii) Australia 
In Australia, planning appeals are variously determined 
b T 1 . C . . 36 h 1 t . . 37 d y own Panning ommissioners, t ere evan Minister an 
independent planning tribunals. 38 However, in New South 1vales, 
planning appeals are dealt with by the Land and Valuation Court, 
and costs, awarded in a like manner as those awarded in a 
'd f th d' • 39 h I JU gment o at court, are iscretionary. Te Courts 
practice, in exercising its discretion, has been to award 
costs to the successful appellant (costs follow the event) 
1 . 1 . f d . 40 un ess a specia reason exists or a opting a contrary course. 
Hence, as a general rule in planning appeals in Australian 
States, costs follow t~e event (the rationale being to indemnify 
the expenses incurred in vindicating the prevailing party's 
rights, although in practice the indemnity is not complete). 
Speculation has however arisen about possible changes in 
cost awards. 41 Australian law reform bodies, acknowledging 
that costs indemnity effectively bars judicial recourse for 
environmental and public interest groups, have recommended 
that the unsuccessful party to planning appeals should not 
be liable for the other parties' costs. This readiness to 
/ abandon 
10 . 
abandon the general rule in public interest suits to make 
judicial proceedings viable would effectively re-enact the 
American Rule as to cost awards. The rationale behind 
such proposals is equally germane to independent planning 
tribunals. 
Cost awards by planning appeal bodies overseas reflects 
a diverse response, with a marked divergence between the 
United States and other common law jurisdictions. This 
disparity hinges on the inherent l nature of planning appeals, 
and the appraisal and degree of recognition accorded to the 
role and value of environmental and public interest appellants 
to the planning process. 
II CURRENT STATE OF EVOLUTION 
Practice Note 
Superseding the prior practice of the Tribunal, the 
new practice note has effected a substantial alteration in 
cost awards in planning appeals. By replacing the earlier 
rule that costs lie where they fall with the overt policy 
that costs will generally be awarded against unsuccessful 
appellants (in the absence of any substantial modification 
of the decision appealed against) 42 the Planning ·rribunal 
has placed costs o~ a decidedly punitive plane. 
Paragraphs five and six of the practice note reinforce 
this punitive aspect. Where a party has been required to 
prove undisputed facts the rribunal felt should have been 
admitted by the other party, the former explicitly states 
such a factor to be germane to the award and quantum of 
costs. Under the latter, attention is drawn to section 
147(2) where costs are awarded to the Crown where a party 
fails to prosecute a proceeding at a time fixed for its 
hearing, or to provide adequate notice of t~e abandonment of 
I a proceeding. 
11. 
a proceeding. 
However, in the limited realm of planning appeals 
under section 49 T.C.P. Act (concerning proposed appeals, 
variations on review of a district scheme) and section 
26G W.S.C. Act (dealing with Tribunal appeals against 
classification) which have proceeded to a hearing, this 
stringency is somewhat relaxed - costs will not be awarded 
· . 1 . 4 3 . . 1 1 . 11 save in exceptiona circumstances. Costs simi ar y wi 
not be awarded against the public body against whose 
decision the appeal is brought. 44 
Has the abuse of the appeal procedure been so considerable 
as to justify these intrinsically punitive measures? Certainly 
it becomes readily apparent that the encouragement of public 
participation in the planning process as reflected in an 
individual's statutory right to appeal was not the considera-
tion uppermost in the Tribunal's mind, when formulating this 
current practice note. What were the reasons behind this 
overtly deterrent approach? 
To the contrary, the Tribunal's intention has been 
expressed as encouraging public participation in the appellate 
procedure. 45 Where there has been a justifiable cause for 
bringing the appeal, the appellant will not be ordered to 
pay costs, the success or otherwise of the appeal immaterial. 
However, where the decision appealed against was reasonable 
and proper, the Tribunal being in no better position to decide 
the issue, then the appellant's failure will as a matter of 
th . 46 course draw e costs sanction. 
Is the reasonableness or otherwise of the local authority's 
decision so self evident? The Tribunal's admirable and 
completely justified intention may in practice prove futile. 
Prima facie, the potential financial burden incurred in 
presenting an appeal, let alone any cost award, would seem to 
/ provide 
12. 
provide an implicit sanction, instilling extreme caution 
before an appeal is lodged. Is this additional sanction, 
placing a new and different emphasis on costs, necessary? 
As a general rule, an appellant's failure will now 
. th . 47 h . . f incur e costs sanction. In t at situation costs, or 
the prevailing party, will follow the event. In stark 
contrast, where the appellant is the prevailing party, 
succeeding on appeal, there is no correspondent costs award. 
The rule states that 11 ••• the Tribunal will as a general 
practice order an appellant who failed ... to pay costs to 
the other parties to the appeal II 48 The applicant's 
or respondent's failure will not draw the same automatic 
costs sanction. Costs entitlement is not implicit for all 
prevailing parties - only for the prevailing respondent or 
applicant. 
The practice note thus reveals a double sided coin -
the deterrent factor that an unsuccessful appellant, as such 
and as a general rule, will have to pay costs, being made 
doubly vicious in its practical application by the total 
absence of any corresponding and balancing factor of costs 
entitlement. 
The Franks Committee in the United Kingdom (1957) 
regarding cost awards at statutory inquiries, recommended 
that the successful appellant in planning appeals should 
be awarded costs. In declining to adopt this recommendation, 
the United Kingdom Council on Tribunals although persuaded by 
evidence that such proposals would have a harmful effect on 
planning administration, qualified its own recommendat ions by 
proposing that where there is little or no merit in one 
objection over ahother (policy or chance being the determining 
factor), the unsuccessful objector who had not behaved 
unreasonably should be awarded costs. The Ministry Circular, 
while not implementing either proposal, did however allow 
/ costs 
13. 
costs to successful appellants in specific situations. 
Recognition of the validity of cost awards to successful 
appellants ip planning appeals by such an authoritative 
committee indicates such proposals as certainly deserving 
of consideration . 
The practice note, it is submitted, reflects a further 
step along the continuum of restriction and increasing 
stringency of planning appeals, effectively deterring both 
the frivolous and bona fide appellants. 
Remarkables Decision 
The separate costs decision of the Number Three 
division in the Remarkables Protection Committee v Lake 
County Council and Mount Cook Group 4 9 represents the 
first application of the practice note, and highlights 
the intentions and practice of the Planning Tribunal. 
The Protection Committee was challenging a decision of 
the council, granting planning consent to the Mount Cook 
Group to develop the Rastus Burn skifield at the western 
end of the Remarkables range. The Tribunal awarded $8,500 
costs against the Protection Committee - the unparalleled 
quantum
50 
of the award merely a reflection of recent cost 
increases. 
A reading of the Remarkables decision concomitant with 
the practice note, illustrates the practical consequence of 
not merely mulcting frivolous and unjustified appeals in 
costs, but furthermore, actively discouraging any initiation 
of appeals, justified or otherwise. The Tribunal in this 
sense, has clearly overreached itself, adopting a negative 
and blatantly punitive stance towards appellants in the 
planning process . Whilst cost awards under section 147 are 
admittedly discretionary , ~1e current position may be seen 
/ as a 
14. 
as a total denigration of the spirit behind the legislation, 
51 and a gravitation away from any environmental considerations. 
III THE REMARKABLES DECISION IN DETAIL 
Modification 
Reflecting the application of the practice note, 5 2 prima 
facie it should therefore follow that the Protection Committee 
had failed to obtain both the relief sought by the appeal, and 
any substantial modification of the decision appealed against. 
Does the case itself bear out this interpretation? 
In dismissing the Protection Committee's substantive 
appeal, the Tribunal's decision had effected a two-fold 
modification of the earlier decision both as to the conditions 
imposed by the council and consent to depart from the scheme. 
In holding such modifications were not substantial, the 
Tribunal was therefore able to make an award of costs. In 
view of the amendments effected by the decision however, it 
is submitted it was open to the Tribunal, at this point and 
without more to hold the prac tice note as inapplicable,and 
hence an award of costs not appropriate. Conceivably, policy 
considerations of the Tribuna l, and its apprais a l of the 
planning appeal's function were determinative factors of this 
potential watersh ed. 
Merits 
Explicit recognition of the merits of the Protection 
Committe e's case 53 provide d no justifica tion for refusing 
a costs award aga ins t the appellant, and the Tribunal s aw 
" ... no grounds for tre ating D~is a ppellant differently 
/ from 
54 
from any other appellant advancing a similar case". 
15. 
Why not? The appeal involved an environmental issue, . 
by nature a subjective and imprecise concept, neither 
imbued with any concrete manifestation of benefit, nor of 
positive development (merely representing an action to 
maintain the status quo). The Protection Committee with no 
self interest to protect (no property or commercial interests) 
acted in the public interest, promoting an issue of national, 
regional and local importance. Equally, the nature of the 
remedy sought contained no incentive of financial recompense, 
let alone gain, from the action. 
It has been said that "A judge should be conscious of 
the felt necessities of the time". 55 Is this consciousness 
solely economic, taking cognisance of increasing costs and 
inflation, and irrespective of the acknowledged merits of 
the case? Similarly, are administrative requirements the 
"necessities" and not environmental considerations? 
Principle Ground of the Decision 
The kernel of the decision, and seemingly the sole 
justification for the award and quantum of costs was the 
appellant's conduct of its case, whereby the applicant and 
respondent were occasioned additional expense. Failure to 
comply with another practice note requiring the provision of 
evidence briefs in advance of the hearing of an appeal, and 
post-hearing and mid-appeal preparation of technical evidence 
were judged reprehensible. Certainly, the Protection 
Committee, if not already aware of these· procedural require-
ments, ought to have been informed of their existence by 
counsel. From the decision, compliance with such requirements 
appears essential, and patently, failure to do so was fatal, 
even with an explicit recognition of the merits. 
/ Does 
16. 
Does this constitute the promotion of administrative 
efficiency and formalised procedural requirements at the 
expense and sacrifice of consideration of environmental 
objectives? Certainly what seems like a developing plethora 
of practice notes structure G~e right of public participation 
in planning appeals. 
Appellant's Grounds for Costs Exemption 
The Protection Committee resisted the cost applications 
of the other parties on the grounds that it represented a 
"relevant aspect of the public interest", on a matter of 
national, regional and local importance, and where a commercial 
enterprise was the subject of the appeal . Much criticism 
may be levelled at the Tribunal's 'resolution' of these issues, 
particularly since barring its cursory remark that careful 
considerat ion had been given them, it appears not to have 
addressed these points at all. Certainly they provided no 
grounds for special treatment of the appellant. 
The definitive character of the public interest in any 
planning matter was ignored. Under the legislation, any 
" ••• body or person representing some relevant aspect of 
the public interest ... " 56 has a statutory right to object 
(recognising the value of such participation to planning 
decisions). 
The Tribunal chose to ignore its earlier recognition 
f . f ubl' . 57 h p · o important matters o p ic interest. Te rotection 
Committee members, not being owners of land affected by the 
proposal, howeve r possess no other legal avenue through which 
to advance their bona fide objection - the statutory right 
of appeal represented their sole recourse. 58 
The new practice note did not inhibit these prospective 
appellants, the appeal application being lodged prior to the 
/ publication 
17. 
publication of the practice note. In Woolworths v 
Dunedin City Counci159 t~is same fact was held to preclude 
the application of the new practice note, the award of costs 
' 
being dealt with under the earlier regime. Prima facie 
therefore, the same considerations should apply here, but as 
borne out by the decision, the post-application publication 
of the practice note was conveniently overlooked. Conceivably, 
a breach of the Tribunals earlier admonition against pursuing 
essentially value judgements at the appellate level 
60 
may 
have justified the cost award against the appellants. This 
premise would thus render invocation of the practice note 
superfluous, and the procedural objection without substance. 
In the absence of overt recognition of the warning, and 
indeed in the face of explicit reference to the practice 
role 61 the former is unlikely to be the grounds warranting 
the award. Certainly the fundamental nature of the decisional 
basis, and the gravity of the cost award, would of necessity, 
dictate an explicit acknowledgment of the actual ground for 
decision. 
Considerations of far wider import than those usually 
relevant to planning appeals were involved - not merely the 
lf . . f . 62 . se -interest action o property protection, or protection 
of commercial and business interests, but the wider, more 
pervasive protection of a unique mountain environment . As 
here, where the issues raised are of more than local signi-
ficance, and the outcome will clearly affect subsequent decisions 
elsewhere, the participants can be seen to argue a particularly 
unselfish case, certainly not being activated by self-interest. 
On this ground alone, any cost.award against such appellants 
is inappropriate . 
The Tribunal decisions in Woolwor~1 s v Dunedin City Council~
3 
and Queens Drive Pharmacy Ltd v Lower Hutt City Council, 64 
where the unsuccessful appellants, possessing a commercial 
or property interest in the appeal were required to pay 
/ costs 
18. 
costs, and Auckland Regional Authority and Others v 
Rodney County Council,6 5 where public interest appellants 
relying especially on the preservation of conservational 
or scenic amenities, and failing against local authority 
approval of a commercial enterprise, have not normally 
been sanctioned with costs, were raised as justifying the 
appellant's costs exemption. 
Rightly perhaps, rejecting the latter (where no 
explanation as to the non-award of costs was given), the 
Tribunal failed even to address itself to the former. 
Conceivably, since the Protection Committee possessed 
neither commercial nor property interests in the appeal, 
it was open to the Tribunal to hold the self-interest 
consideration as the basis of costs liability, and reject 
the costs sanction where public interest was the sole 
motivation. It did not do so. 
Actual Costs Award 
Consequently, no reason militated against a cost 
award. Four factors guided the Tribunal's quantwn 
assessment: 
1. Appellants's failure to comply with the 
evidential practice note. 
2. A rejection of the argument that full 
preparation of the appellant's case was 
not possible until after the local authority 
hearing. 
3. The appeal causing the re-presentation of 
applicant's substantial case. 
4. Benefit derived by the applicant from the 
appeal decision ( the amendment of consent 
to include consent to depart from the operative 
scheme) . 
/ The 
19. 
The final cost awards - respectively $3,500 to 
the Lake County Council, and $5,000 to the Mount Cook 
Group
66
were ,determined by a contributory payment towards 
67 expert witness expenses, and a party and party award, 
for legal costs. Although expressly rejecting a total 
costs indemnity in the present case as tantamount to 
awarding costs on a solicitor and client basis , its 
possible justification (albeit in a rare circumstance) 
was countenanced. 68 
The unprecedented and excessive nature of the total 
costs liability of the Protection Committee received scant 
recognition, especially in light of the Tribunal's 
hollow justification - a realistic appraisal of recent cost 
increases. Grave concern is engendered by the suggestion 
of a reduction in the actual costs award, because of the 
benefit derived by the applicant from the appeal decision. 
In the absence of this admitted benefit concession, a hiatus 
characterises the Tribunal I s cost award; the quantum 
presumably being considerably less than the total $41,338.61 
claimed, which the Tribunal considered excessive. 
"De novo 11 Hearing 
Illucidating on the II de novo 11 character of an appeal, 6 9 
the Tribunal in rejecting the appellant's contention regarding 
the preparation of its case (point two above) made it 
abundantly clear that such an appeal was a re-hearing of the 
issue (not a new hearing). Although explicitly recognising 
that the Tribunal is empowered ·to, and in practice frequently 
does hear evidence not raised at first instance, 7 0 this does 
not permit a prospective appellant to treat the local body 
hearing as a kind of II dwnrny run 11 , 71 presenting a limited 
selection of evidence , and relying on its appeal rights to 
expand its c a se. A fine line divides these two states. In 
/ the Remarkables 
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the Remarkables decision the Tribunal clearly felt the initial 
hearing procedure had been abused, and by advancing further 
evidence,the'appellants had both contravened the evidentiary 
practice note, and overstepped the mark. 
The practical justifications for this interpretation 
are obvious. The utility of the initial hearing would 
become farcical, a mere procedura l step, if the planning 
appeal was a "new hearing" of the whole issue - as tl1ough no 
previous hearing had taken place. Time considerations 
similarly would make such an approach untenable and expensive. 
A potential disadvantage if the appeal hearing was in fact a 
new hearing may equally have inspired this interpretation. 
It had been suggested that objectors at the local body hearing 
may have neither the time, funds nor desire to re-appear before 
the Tribunal on appeal, and that consequently the Tribunal would 
be adjudicating the matter upon a smaller presentation of 
'd 72 evi ence. 
The Act itself, in providing that " ... for the purposes 
of hearing and determining any appeal (the Tribunal) shall 
have all the powers, duties, functions that the body 
against whose decision the appeal is brought had in respect 
of the same matter" 
7 3 
certainly lends credence to the 
"de novo" interpretation. 
In light of the "de novo" character of an appeal, it 
would seem essential that the Tribunal, to ascertain establish ed 
facts and prevent prolixity, have available to it a record of 
prior proceedings at the hearirtg. However, this is not the 
point. The fact is that no such record is required. There-
fore, is it then encumbent upon the Tribunal to take cognisance 
of the evidence produced at first instance? 
74 
Local Authority Hearings 
The Tribunal stressed the importance of local authority 
/ hearings 
21. 
75 
hearings being as full as possible - examining all 
relevant aspects of the issue and hearing all the avail-
abl 'd 76 e expert evi ence . 
Practically, is it possible for such hearings to 
deal with the real business of planning, and leave the 
appeal procedure merely as 11 ••• an opportunity to resolve 
"? 77 . f . unresolved conflicts ... . Prima acie, no. Current 
practice of many local authorities is to keep planning 
hearings as relaxed and informal as possible, 
78 
and perhaps 
in line with this, no provision is made for cross examination 
f . d th . f . 79 o witnesses an e testing o evidence. Equally under 
the 1977 Act, no record of evidence and witnesses heard at 
the local authority hearing is kept for possible production 
80 on appeal. 
Widespread misconception of the nature of the planning 
appeal as being a second step in some sort of judicial 
8 1 process has been noted. - The 1970 Report of the Public 
and Administrative Law Reform Committee, in recommending 
a right of appeal from the Appeal Board's decision to the 
Administrative Division of the Supreme Court, emphasised 
this point. 11 ••• as the hearing at the local body level 
is so rudimentary often the Appeal Board is in fact 
giving the matter its first judicial consideration II 
8 2 
Bearing in mind the appellant's status of an environ-
mental group of limited (particularly financial) resources 
is it tenable to require the presentation of all the 
available expert evidence at first instance? Or is the 
more reasonable course to present a survey of evidence felt 
sufficient to have the objection uph e ld? Any bona fide 
group genuinely upholding environmental considerations will , 
in the circumstance of a dismissal, and financial resources 
permitting, go on to appeal, and equally obviously , will 
then advance any further evidence required to present its 
case. 
/ In this 
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In this light, the Tribunal's rejection of the 
appellant's contended inability to full (or more fully) 
prepare its case until after the local body hearing seems . 
overly harsh. The potential sanction of costs incurred 
in presenting the appeal represents a major disincentive, so 
surely the fruition of an appeal indicates the bona fide 
nature of the group - and not, as may be gleaned from the 
decision, the lodging of an appeal merely as a perverse 
and delaying tactic. 
These questions of course arise on every appeal, and 
are matters solely within the Tribunal's discretion, but 
it is sug:rested that prevalent features in the instant 
case were not adequately countenanced in the Tribunal's 
resolution of these issues. It was encumbent upon the 
Tribunal therefore, to err on the side of leniency. 
Application of the Practice Note 
In view of its recent introduction, it is submitted 
the Planning Tribunal adopted an unnecessarily harsh approach 
in its implementation of the practice note in the Remarkables 
costs decision. Indeed it was open to the Tribunal to 
adopt either an alternative approach , or a more palatable 
(and less punitive) application. That the appeal application 
had preceded the practice note (which logically would invoke 
a "first in time" rule was conveniently overlooked, and 
despite the Woolworths decision ,
83 
which the Tribunal had 
rejected the application of the practice note on that very 
ground. Equally, the "test case" analysis was a viable 
alternative - that in the circumstances of this case (the 
first application of the practice note) a less stringent 
1
. . 84 app 1cat1on was more just. 
However, the Protection Commit tee appear the unfortunate 
recipients of the Tribunal's desire to teach appellants a 
/ lesson 
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lesson and place a check on the supposedly flagrant 
disregard of the principles underlying the povision of a 
planning app~al. The practice note appears as another 
weapon in an administrative arsenal of the Tribunal, with 
costs an administrative expedient and environmental con-
siderations comparatively oti o se . 
From latent ambiguities in the Remarkables decision, 
one crucial question surfaces: How does the Planning Tribunal 
fix costs, when there is no scale upon which to rely? 
Section 147 gives the Tribunal a complete discretion. 
Do they have their own esoteric method of fixing costs? 8 5 
Certainly the Remarkables decision provides no clue. A 
distinct paucity of any prescribed cost scale characterises 
Planning Tribunal awards. Award quantum, a question solely 
for the Tribunal, does vary, although prior to the Remarkables 
. 8 6 . decision, not to any substantial degree . In comparison to 
the likely cost of a planning appeal, the proportion of costs 
awarded tended to be relatively small, dependent upon the 
P. 7 circumstances leading to an award. ~ By stark contrast, the 
$8,500 Remarkables award is of great moment. 
Considering the extensive jurisdiction and on-going 
influence of Tribunal decisions, the issues canvassed in 
planning appeals often are of equal if not wider import than 
those of ordinary civil litigation, involving a one-off 
resolution of a dispute. Yet no scale of costs regulates 
Tribunal awards. By comparison, the District Court in 
exercising its power to award costs, admittedly discretionary, 
l 1 1 · d . . . 88 1 f. d 1as c ear y impose restrictions. Cost sea es are ixe , 
with witnesses' expenses readily quantifiable . The unsuccessful 
litigant knows, with certainty, the exact extent of costs 
liability he is likely to incur. 89 
Since enforcement of Tribunal costs orders, if required, 
/ is a 
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i-s a matter either for the High Court or Dis tri et Court 
(depending upon the amount involved) 90 and an expressed 
willingness by the Tribunal to take some guidance from the 
Code of Civil Procedure, 91 recourse to those prescribed 
scales in determining cost awards is suggested appropriate. 
Presently the inequitous and vulnerable position of environ-
mental and public interest appellants is perpetuated by an 
indeterminate liability, couched in the arcane and uncertain 
nature of Tribunal cost awards. 
IV POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
Does the Remarkables Decision Implement the Legislation? 
Section 147 providing the Tribunal wit~ a discretion 
as to costs, then at a superficial level, the Remarkables 
decision has implemented the legislation. However, it is 
submitted the possibility of such a punitive award was neither 
intended nor envisaged by the framers of the Act . 
Widening public participation rights and promoting 
explicit recognition and consideration of environmental 
matters are the twin philosophies to be gleaned from its 
legislative inception. Introducing the 1977 Bill , the 
Minister of Works and Development commented "I am fully 
aware of the present concern for the protection of the 
environment, and the Bill gives more emphasis to the environ-
mental considerations greater opportunities are provided 
for public participation ... these include an extension of 
the rights of ... interested parties, such as progressive 
associations and environmental groups , to be heard by 
councils and the Planning Tribunal ... 11' 92. The extended 
objection rights provided in the Act 
93 
bear out this policy 
/ of encouraging 
of encouraging public participation in the planning 
process. 
Such exhortations may in practice prove to be 
25. 
futile; certainly the Remarkables decision has done 
little to affirm those precepts. In dismissing with 
impunity the recognised substantive merits of the environ-
mentalists' case (these merits providing no basis for 
excluding a costs award) the Tribunal appears myopically 
absorbed with the costs issue. Clearly the award quantum 
affords scant recognition of the environmental import of 
the case. Widened participatory rights equally appear 
evanescent in the face of procedural requirements whose 
compliance appears a pre-requisite both to effective 
participation,
94 
and to preclude inhibitive cost awards. 
The Tribunal's role of actively countenancing the 
95 
environmental issues in its resolution of the competing 
interests apparently has been delegated,by default, to 
environmentally concerned groups ~
6
groups the Tribunal, 
via its increasingly regulative administration, has shown 
little disposition to recognise or accommodate. This 
represents a radical departure from the spirit and policy 
of the legislation, particularly the flagrant disregard 
if unsuccessful, for the especial considerations of 
environmental and public interest appellants. 
Role of the Planning Tribunal 
Regarding the role of the Planning Tribunal, philosophy 
and fact pointedly diverge. That " ... the Tribunal will 
fulfil a very important role in environmental planning under 
the new ( 19 77) Act ... " 97 is patently evident. Potentially 
prodigious, the intention of promoting environmental planning 
and the protection of the environment, has succumbed to the 
actuality of administrative machinery, exerting an influential 
/ role 
role by discouraging the initiation of environmental 
action. 
(i) Statutory basis 
26. 
The purely statutory jurisdiction of the Tribunal, 
widened under the 1977 legislation, is appellate only (not 
9 8 being involved in the planning process as such). The 
appeal being a hearing "de novo", it follows that every 
person with a right of objection at first instance has 
the right to state that case before the appellate authority 99 
(although tempered somewhat by comments in the Remarkables 
decision). 
Statutory recognition of an individual's right to 
· · loo. h 1 . . ff d b h participate in t e panning process is e ecte y t e 
provision of administrative review and appeal procedure. 
This statutory right to object and appeal, recognised as 
1 0 1 a pre-requisite for the promotion of environmental quality 
is amplified by the applicant's need to get planning consent 
before any proposed development may proceed. 
The continued availability and viability of this right 
at both stages of the planning process is crucial to preclude 
any wane of effective public participation. In practical 
terms however, the effect of the Remarkables decision is 
that this right is exercisable only at the local authority 
hearing; if taken further, the Tribunal adopts a more rigid 
attitude towards its exercise. 
(ii) Assertion of public initiative in environmental 
management 
The absence of early and adequate public consultation 
and debate has been recognis e d in the 1981 OECD Report as 
" ... a fundamental weakness in New Zealand's planning 
/ procedures". 
102 procedures". Early integration of environmental 
concerns, and improvements to existing mechanisms to 
" ... avoid,overlapping and unreasonable procedural 
delays in the preparation and implementation of devel-
1 .. ,.1 0 3 d opment po 1c1es ... were suggeste to encourage 
27. 
public participation. While the Remarkables decision 
prima facie promotes the early integration of environmental 
concerns (evidenced by the desire that local authority 
hearings be as full as possible) the reality undermines 
and stultifies the very concept of integration. Local 
authority hearings, by their very nature imbued with a 
developmental bias, 
104
merely exemplify the OECD's noted 
absence of effective integration of environmental concerns. 
Thus effective integration of environmental concerns at 
the appellate level is fundamental, yet c l ea r ly ne ithe r the 
Remarkables decision nor the practice note have re-asserted 
the public initiative in environmental management. 
( iii) Tribunal membership 
Membership provisions under the 1977 Act essentially 
mirror those enacted in 1953. The Tribunal, constituted 
by a Chairman, two persons in effect recommended by the 
Municipal Association and the countries association and 
one other 105 reflects a distinct abs e nce of any specialist 
requirement of the members. The Planning Tribunal's role 
has however changed over those twenty- fou r y e ars. Ori g i nally 
providing administrative recourse and protection to land 
owners adversely affected by arbitrary and unreasonable 
local authority decisions, today the Tribunal, under an 
increasingly conservationist mandate, deals with appellants 
who are often public interest groups concerned with wider 
matters of principle. 
Administrative bias is inherent in L~e membership 
selection process. Section 131(1) (b) emphasises individuals 
/ who 
who most likely have worked for local authorities or 
government, and consequently who will be familiar (and 
perhaps enamoured?) with bureaucracy. The possibility 
, 
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of an "insider perspective" developing from this single-
minded "expertise" (if membership requirements may be 
so termed) cannot be discounted. Current Tribunal 
membership, viewed alongside their respective positions 
prior to appointment highlights this suggested administra-
. . 106 tive propensity. 
Sir Guy Powles has viewed with alarm the development 
of "pseudo-democratic-bureaucratic structures" in New 
Zealand. · " ... with this proliferation of these appointed 
semi-bureaucratic authorities, the citizen may be, 
effect, losing control of his environment by means 
machinery designed to effect its control". 
107 
in 
of the 
Current implementation of the T.C.P. Act provides an 
excellent example. Administrative machinery (Tribunal 
practice notes) increasingly regulate the appellate 
procedure, and any possibility of an environmental mandate 
under the Act influencing the determination of planning 
appeals is remote. Furthermore, costs increasingly appear 
an administrative expedient, deterring appellant invocation 
of the appeal procedure and punishing appellant failure on 
appeal; legislative exhortations to consider environmental 
factors in no sense determinative in the cost award. The 
public, via environmental and public interest organisations, 
are losing control of their environment, as the Planning 
Tribunal becomes bogged down in a mire of administrative 
regulation. 
Environmental Planning 
The overtly deterrent and punitive nature of the costs 
award in the Remarkables case, inhibiting any initiation of 
/ appeals, 
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appeals, but particularly so by environmental appellants, 
raises several disquieting issues in the environmental 
planning context. 
(i) Flexibility 
This context dictates a flexibility of approach by 
the Planning Tribunal. Appellate procedure cannot be 
formulated as immutable rules, of absolute application. 
Yet the practice note, by providing that costs, as a 
general rule, will be awarded against unsuccessful 
appellants, has done just this. Several illustrations 
reflect the inappropriateness of such a stance. 
The burden of proof concept, whilst basic to legal 
practice, is wholly inappropriate to the administrative 
procedures demanded by modern environmental legislation. 
In one sense, the planning appellant is saddled with the 
onus of justifying his appeal, but once satisfied,policy 
and public interest considerations are more appropriate 
and illuminating than any doctrine of onus probandi. 
Indeed the Tribunal has explicitly stated no onus of proof 
rests on either party. 108 Yet Greensill v Northland 
1 09 d d . . 11 0 Catchment Commission an the Royal Forest ec1s1on 
appear in stark contrast. Although in the former, the 
decision not couched in terms of an onus, the Tribunal 
denied water rights, due to the applicant's failure to 
show the taking of water as safe or beneficial. Similarly 
for appellants; the Tribunal in the latter holding that 
the appellants would need overwhelming evidence to succeed 
on appeal. Patently an onus of proof does exist in the 
planning process; the express denial appearing a glib 
and superficial statement. 
The costs ruling in the practice note, and as applied 
in the Remarkables case, is totally misconceived in the 
/ planning 
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planning context, and most pointedly so since the Act, 
in exhorting the consideration of environmental factors, 
dictates a subjective analysis and weighing of competing , 
principles, in each case. Environmental and public 
interest appellants do not assert tangible economic rights, 
where damages would be the appropriate remedy, but instead 
propound the intangibles of environmental conservation, 
seeking specific non-pecuniary relief (injunction, mandamus 
and declaratory judgment). The incongruence of one 
immutable costs principle, of general application across 
the board, is evident. 
The complete paucity of statutory guidelines in 
th . . h' h b . . . d b h 'b 1
111 
is weig 1ng process as een cr1t1c1se y t e Tri una, 
yet despite this, the Tribunal has readily assumed the over-
112 
whelming benefits of resource development. This 
assumption seems endemic. The overt policy of the Act 
· (prescribing this balancing process) may well be the 
progenitor of this bias 113 since in weighing the tangible 
economic and social benefits against the intangible environ-
mental beliefs, the scales invariably tip in favour of the 
former. In broader terms, this exploitative bias results 
from the prevalence of the consumption over the non-consumptive 
use of resources. 114 
Even rejecting this suggested development bias, the 
Tribunal's approach to matters of proof, effectively requiring 
an objector/appellant to prove the environment will suffer, 
rather than requiring the applicant to show it will not, 
lends some weight to its contemplation. Patently, in 
the face of an already pun'itive and deterrent costs sanction 
on appeal, the possibility of failure through the operation 
of any such inherent "tendency II poses a looming prospect for 
environmental appellants. The Tribunal should not be 
wedded to immutable rules, particularly those invoking the 
/ costs 
costs sanction and thereby eschew a flexibility in 
approach - a flexibility that appears positively 
dictated by the very nature of the issues raised. 
(ii) Environmental appellants 
31. 
Environmental and public interest groups pursuing 
planning appeals are deserving of special consideration by 
the Planning Tribunal. Acting in the public interest, their 
ability to participate, financially, is inhibited by random 
ad hoe sources of support (often relying on public funding, 
private foundations and individual contributions) which 
cannot hope to meet the cost of effective participation on 
a sustained basis. 
Before any Tribunal cost award, prior sanctions impose 
a heavy burden on environmental appellants. Of initial 
and paramount consideration is the cost of their own partici-
pation in the planning process, do they have the resources, 
time and capital to even instigate an appeal? Any potential 
burdens attendant upon the fruition of the appeal represented 
remote considerations. Conceivably however the Remarkables 
decision and the practice note may have effected a reversal, 
and certainly a watershed in this practice, now to some 
extent dictating greater consideration of the cost implications 
prior to formally lodging an appeal. 
Equally, non pecuniary remedies, while most appropriate 
in environmental appeals, provide little (if any) incentive 
to instigating an action. Clearly the public will benefit 
from an injunction; however only the richest and most dedicated 
of environmental appellants could or would bear the economic 
brunt of a protracted appeal. The potential dampening effect 
of these remedies cannot be discounted. 
Although public minded individuals and environmental 
/ groups 
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groups are logically the proper agents to defend environ-
ment rights, neither the practice note nor the Rernarkables 
decision eff~cts cognisance of their role. 
In view of the extended objection rights under section 
2(3) of the Act, encouraging public participation, a 
widening of the cost award exceptions in the practice note 
is suggested a mandatory measure. Where the legislation 
relies on appellants invoking "public interest" grounds to 
effectuate planning policy, at the very least removal of 
the costs sanction is necessary to ensure the initiation 
of an appeal, and more positively, where public interest 
appellate action has been successful, a commensurate cost 
award therefore should be permitted. The substantial benefits 
to the public should not depend upon the financial status of 
the individual volunteering to serve as the appellant, or 
the charity of public-minded lawyers. 
In light of the Planning Tribunal's present intransigent 
stance towards planning appellants, even the American Rule 
(that costs lie where they fall) inspires comparative promise 
although no benefit accrues to the successful appellant 
(as is presently the position), however upon failure, no 
threat of potentially indeterminate liability for the other 
party's costs arises, each party merely paying its own costs. 
V THE FUTURE 
Significance of the Remarkables Decision 
Is the practice note a mere palliative, alleviating 
the short term problem of abuse of planning appeals, by 
totally discouraging any appeals, frivolous or justified, 
/ and yet 
and yet without effectively curing the problem? Its 
application in the Remarkables decision certainly has 
not allayed public concern and disquiet over the costs . 
question. 
33. 
Tribunal decisions, being of pervasive and enduring 
influence (if anything, more significant for the future 
than the present) thus augur the substantial and alarming 
significance of the Remarkables decision for future environ-
mental and public interest appellants. Potentially indeterminate 
costs liability in the partisan and hostile arena of the 
Planning Tribunal hardly provides a conducive atmosphere 
for the initiation of planning appeals. 
Appellants increasingly will have to pay for their 
right to participate in planning appeals. However, there 
is no need to worry unduly about developers or appellants 
who initiated the first instance hearing, the cost of 
the exercise merely part of the gamble inherent in any 
development proposal. Local authorities similarly have 
no cause for alarm, having recourse to the public purse, 
and the shield of the practice note, paragraph four (unless 
having acted unreasonably or perversely). The target of 
concern must be those appellants, with no proprietory interest 
in the land, or proposed development, bar the amorphous 
"public interest", but who choose to exercise their statutory 
right of participation. The law having recognised the value 
of such participants to decision making by providing a right 
to be heard, the actuality ought not to denigrate from this. 
Any suggestion that the cumulative effect of these two 
measures will effectively quash any appellate recourse to 
the Planning Tribunal is naive. Bona fide environmental 
and public interest organisations possessing a meritorious 
case will not be deterred from seeking the avenue of the 
planning appeal to pursue their legitimate rights of appeal 
LAW LIBRARY / against 
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against an unreasonable decision. However, administrative 
and procedural complexities of the Planning Tribunal emphasise 
the definite need for professional legal advice in the 
preparation of appeals, an increased sophistication in 
approach, and perhaps also the invocation of alternative 
f d
. 115 . . . . . un ing sources, as essential to maintaining their 
viability - prior to any initiation of action. Any belief 
in the Act's statutory right of appeal, on its face value, 
being sufficient grounds is patently ill-founded. 
What lessons may be learnt from the Remarkables decision? 
Incorporation of environmental and public interest groups is 
a pre-requisite to any initiation of action, to prevent 
personal costs liability. The Remarkables costs order 
being made against the nine named members of the society, 
. . l d 116 . . Joint y an severally, hence upon exhaustion of Protection 
Committee funds (as inevitably must occur with a protracted 
and unsuccessful appeal) each named member will then be 
personally liable for payment of the costs award. It is 
indeed anomalous where members of the public, pursuing an 
environmental action in the public interest, are yet faced 
with personal liability if unsuccessful, solely because of 
their vindication of a governmental policy. 
Avoidance of a potentially prohibitive cost award, 
attendant upon appellate failure, otherwise hinges round 
a strict compliance with the Tribunal's practice note. 
"Justifiable grounds" must exist for invoking the appeal 
process, otherwise where the decision appealed against was 
a reasonable and proper one, the appellant merely seeking 
a re-hearing of the original argument, the costs sanction 
will be invoked. Effecting a substantial modification of 
the decision appealed against, although failing on the 
appeal itself, will however exclude the application of a 
costs award. 
The appellant must have standing to appeal, and the 
/ appeal 
appeal itself must not be frivolous, vexatious or 
malicious. Non-compliance with these points is likely 
35. 
to draw the sanction of costs, and similarly where one 
party has been put to proof of facts the Tribunal felt 
should have been admitted - care must be taken to secure 
agreement on areas where the facts are undisputed. The 
varied procedural requirements of the Tribunal will likely 
hold such failure caused the other party an increased 
burden in the presentation of its case, and costs will 
inevitably follow. 
Regarding the procedural issues, compliance appears 
straight forward. But while mere disagreement with the 
local authority decision obviously is no grounds for an 
appeal, the justifiability or otherwise of the appeal is 
not readily apparent. That remains a nebulous and sub-
jective concept, involving a value judgement. The practice 
note, it is submitted, provides minimal if indeed any 
guidance on this point, and does little to clarify or 
ameliorate an appellant's position. 
Future for Planning Appellants 
Does the Remarkables decision provide peril or 
promise? For would-be developers, and indeed any respondent 
in a planning appeal, certainly promise. If prevailing, 
costs indemnity by the "loser", as a matter of course, provides 
a positive inducement to success on appeal (except where a 
substantial modification of the earlier decision was effected), 
and failure not drawing a costs sanction unless, in the 
Tribunal's discretion, they are deserving of that sanction. 
By comparison, burgeoning financial liability for the 
appellant from the inception of an appeal, is further 
accentuated by the p e ril of a cost award. In the absence 
/ of any 
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_of any correspondent incentive, the appellant faces 
either ambivalence upon success (no cost award to positively 
or negative~y alleviate his position) or the inevitable 
and presently indeterminate costs liability upon failure. 
Extreme caution is engendered by the extent of the 
Remarkables costs award. The costs sanction, traditionally 
just that, has now assumed vast proportions. By eliminating 
its earlier discretion in favour of an explicitly deterrent 
costs award, the Tribunal has taken a retrogressive step, 
in a planning regime supposedly promoting public participa-
tion, by its unwarranted limitation on the right of appellate 
recourse. Awareness of the growing concern for environmental 
protection, an acknowledged and integral part of the planning 
function, must be realised and practically applied by the 
Planning Tribunal. Failure at the administrative level 
to perceive and implement these considerations indicates a 
hardening of approach towards environmental issues, or indeed 
a total abdication of function. In line with the former, 
the recent appearance of the contraversial National Development 
Act 1979 may now be an example of the legislative pendulum 
starting to swing against extensive and prolonged public 
involvement in environmental issues. 
Post Remarkables Decisions 
To date, post Remarkables cost awards of the Tribunal 
have not proved to be of great moment, award quantum generally 
adhering to the pre-Remarkables costs practice. Dismissal 
of the applicant's appeal in Rountree v Minister of Works 
and Development117 drew a $612 cost award against the Minister, 
and in Tutbury v Tauranga City Council, 11 8 while acknowledging 
it to be a case where costs ordinarily would be awarded against 
the unsuccessful appellant, the Tribunal declined to do so, 
deciding the appeal on a different basis to the local authority 
/ decision 
- decision (a straight forward application of the practice 
note). Equally, recourse to the High Court has not 
prompted co~t sanctions of any moment. 119 
.'37. 
It is germane to note however that the unsuccessful 
appellants in the majority of these cases have been 
protecting some proprietary interest. By comparison, in 
120 
the Kapuni gas decision, although rejecting the application 
for costs against the Environmental Defense Society, the 
Planning Tribunal explicitly recognised its disposition to 
award substantial costs against E.D.B., barring the fact that 
other objectors had joined its case. The latter, fully 
justified in pursuing their remedies at the appellate level 
(being owners of land affected by the development) achieved 
some degree of success regarding ordinance amendment, and 
accordingly were not sanctioned with costs. Both appeals 
being presented together, the Tribunal therefore found no 
grounds to differentiate between them, and consequently no 
costs were awarded against E.D.B. 
Not unreasonable trepidation is engendered by this 
decision, the Tribunal's cost award openly inimical to 
environmental and public interest appellants. Certainly 
any belief that success on appeal precludes the costs 
. . . abl 121 sanction is question e. 
Conclusion 
Undue administrative expediency, broaching the fine 
line between judicial application and overt deterrence, 
characterises the current role of costs in planning appeals. 
Admittedly the practice note, by its stringent costs rule, 
/ has 
has inhibited abuse of the appellate procedure; and 
· equally the Remarkables decision, by its cost award 
quantum, has castigated environmental appellants for 
their procedural disregard. However, the 'victory' 
is a Pyrrhic one. Prospective appellants are not 
merely occasioned to think carefully about the cost 
implications of initiating an appeal, but in the face 
38. 
of a potentially deleterious cost award, are actively 
discouraged from invoking the appellate procedure altogether. 
The Remarkables cost award, unprecedented in nature 
and explicitly punitive in orientation, has thus effected 
a marked gravitation away from prior costs practice. 
However, continuity is equally apparent; the decision 
a further step on the continuum of Tribunal stringency, 
increasingly subjecting unsuccessful appellants to costs 
liability. Whatever the analysis, the deterrent factor 
is clear. 
For environmental planning appellants, already 
occupying a vulnerable position in the planning process, 
and particularly susceptible to the costs sanction, the 
decision is alarming. Increasingly sanctioned by inhibitive 
cost awards, for environmental appellants the decision may 
indeed reflect their lowest ebb. 
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schedule and memorandum to Brynildsen v Manukau City (1970 ) 
3 NZTPA 260 . 
9Maxwell v Tauranga City (1970) 3 NZTPA 256 . Costs being 
awarded to the Crown where a party failed to appear and his 
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lOArthur v New Plymouth City (1959) 1 NZTPA 84 . 
1 1Patrick v Auckland City (1971) 4 NZTPA 26. Appel l ant 
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1 2Brynildsen supra n . 8 . 
1 3rn Shaw v Bay of Plenty Regional Water Board (19 7 6) 
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Regiona l Water Board in favour of objectors who were 
l argely unsuccessfu l before the Reg i onal Water Board , 
b u t denied their costs on appeal . 
14Provid i ng the Tribunal with jurisdict i on to hear an 
appeal against an order for costs made by the Regional 
Water Board . 
- Southland Acclimatisation Society v Southland Catchment 
Board (19 7 5) 5 NZTPA 188 . 
- EDS Inc . v Waikato Valley Authority (1976) 6 NZTPA 140 . 
1 5wellington Regional Progressive Association v Water 
Allocation Council (1971) 4 NZTPA 154. 
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Metekingi v Rangitikel-Wanganui Water Board (1975) 5 NZTPA 340 . 
1 7 Shaw, supr a n . 13 . 
18Ibid , 160 . The Tribunal a~cepted the wider scope of the 
inqu i ry since the proposed project affected not only water , 
but the land rights of several ~ppellants , who possessed no 
other legal avenue of redress . 
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Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society v Bay of Plenty 
Regional Water Boar d (1978) 6 NZTPA 361 . 
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20Metekingi supra n . 16 . 
Royal Forest and Bird supra n . 19 , 366 "Eve r y value 
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opinion and cannot be fully explained nor indeed 
adequately substantiated ." 
21D,A,R. Wi lliams Environmental Law para 460(Butterworths, 
Wellington , 1980). 
22 In Saunders v Henderson Borough (1978) B 1108 the 
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with the necessary modifications , apply as if the Board were 
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25
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26 
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27Ib ' id, s . 110 
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Study ) Victoria University thesis PhD Wellington 1973 . 
29Ministry Circular 73/65 , para 23, 
Cited in J. Ottaway "Costs and the Local Authority in 
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Environmental Law (U. K.) 1980, 452 . 
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of such awards was based on the i mpracticality of such 
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30 P. McAuslan Land, Law and Planning (Werdenfeld and Nicholson , 
London, 1975). 
31R b' o inson, op .cit.l. 
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By far the majori t y of academic writers express concern 
at the inhib itive effect of the American Rule , and variously 
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- R.L. Matthews "A Setback fo r Environmental and Other 
Public Interest Plaintiffs " (1 975-7 6) 55 Nebraska Law 
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(1 9 78 ) 64 American Bar Association Journal 859, 
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Cited in F . W. Leadbetter "Alternatives for the Recovery of 
Attorney's Fees in Environmental Litigation after Alveska 
Pipeline Service Co. v Wilderness Society 421 US 240 " 
1 6 Natural Resources Journal 1003 . 
34some examples of statutory exceptions : 
1. Citizen suit provisions (authorising citizens to sue 
on behalf of the public) in the Clean Air Act , Toxic 
Substances and Control Act , Clean Waste Act . 
2. Fee reimbursement for public interest participants 
in EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) proceedings 
- EPA Financial Assistance . 
3. Fee u~derwriting as for example in the Toxic Substances 
Control Act . 
However any specific Congressional provision of attorney ' s 
fees is incremental in approach, and likely only to apply 
at the judicial (litigation) level . 
35Alyeska Pipeline Service Co . v Wilderness Society 421 
us 240 ( 1975 ). 
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Local Government Act 1962 , ss 718-761. 
Local Government Acts , 1936- 65 , s . 33(6). 
38
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s . 19 (as substituted by Planning and Development Amendment 
Act 1971 , s . 10 ). 
Victor i a : Town and Country Planning Act 1961 , s . 19A 
(as inserted by T . C . P . Amendment Act 1968 , s . 14( 1 ). ) 
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1928 - 78 (Reprint) s . 44 . 
39
Local Government IT . C . P . ) Amendment Act 1945 , s . 341 (4) . 
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40 
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I b i d , para . 4 . 
45 
Inf r a n . 46 . The Chairman stated the Tribunal did not 
want to stifle meritorious appeals . 
46
The Chairman ' s reply to a Planning Institute letter which 
had expressed concern over the effect of the practice note . 
Ci ted in Environmental Defen~e Society (EDS) News 7 (1 & 2) 3 . 
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':2he Practice Note excludes the rule I s application where the 
appeal decision has effected a substantial modification of 
the earlier decision . Potentially an apparently reasonable 
and viable exclusion 0f sufficient purport to prevent the 
general rule becoming exclusive in application , and deterrent 
i n operation) , in practice it appears mere window dressing . 
48 3 Supra, n . . 
49
supra , n . 4 . Note howeve r that the Tribunal ' s decision 
~annot , at this stage , be regarded as final . Current action 
on the Remarkables case is two fold : 
1 . Appea l 'to the High Court , under s . 162(4) T . C . P . Act on 
a po i nt of law . 
2 . Application for review under the Judicature Amendment 
Act , 1972 (Part I) . 
50cost awards against unsuccessful appellants have ranged 
from $100 in Wellington Regional Progressive Association 
(supra n . 15) to $700 in Steale Properties Ltd v Auckland 
Regional Water Board (1980) 6 NZTPA 629 , and with a 
protracted appeal, were as high as $1,000 in Woolworths 
(supra n . 2) . Distinctively conspicuous , a nil cost award 
was however accompanied by the warning that future failure 
on an appeal involving principally a value judgment would 
l ikely result in a cost order against the appellant - Royal 
Forest case (supra n . 19) . 
5 1upon its introduction , the Minister of Works and Development 
commented " I am fully aware of the present concern for the 
protection of the environment , and the Bill gives more 
emphasis to the new environmental considerations" . These 
considerations are reflected in s s 3 (1) (a) and 4 ( 1) . 
52 11 Like any other appellant , its right to appeal to this 
Tribunal carries with it the possibility that it may have 
an award of costs made against it ". Remarkables, supra n . 4 282 . 
53 Idem . 
54 Idem . 
55Mr Justice Holmes . Cited in P . M. Salmon "Environmental 
Law " 1977 NZLJ 518 , 527 . 
56section 2 ( 3) (d) . 
57 1 . Physical Environmental Association v Thames 
Coromandel District Council (1978) 6 NZTPA 445 . The 
council was ordered to bear the costs of an engineer's report 
obtained at, the Tribunal's direction , as the subject matter 
involved important matters of public interest , and which 
the appellant should not be required to pay as it acted on 
behalf of the public interest . 
2 . Woolworths (supra n . 2) . The Tribunal equally 
recognised the representation principle at the polar extreme , 
where the City Council .represented the interests of the 
community it served . 
3 . In Southland Acclimatisation Society (supra n . 14) 
the Tribunal stressed the instrumentality of lodging an 
objection to raise matters of public interest which the 
Regional Water Board is required to take into account . 
Without that first step , there is no right of appeal should 
the Board fail in its consideration of the public interest . 
4. Kearn v National Water and Soil Conservation Authority 
(1980) 7 NZTPA 11 . The appellant's entitlement to costs, 
by carrying the burden of presenting a matter of considerable 
public interest, was recognised . 
58 In Shaw (supra n . 13) this was recognised as justifiable 
grounds for bringing an appeal . 
59 Supra n . 2 , 4 . 
60 Royal Forest , supra n . 19 . 
61 Supra n . 15. 
62M t k' ' . e e ingi, supra n. 16 . 
63 Supra n. 2 . 
64 Supra n . 22 . 
65 (1979) 6 NZTPA 474. 
66
see Appendix A for a further consideration of cost 
awards. 
67 
062, r 28 (2): 11 ••• costs to which this rule applies 
shall be taxed on a party and party basis; .•• there 
shall be allowed all such costs as were necessary or 
proper for the attainment of justice, or for enforcing 
or defending the rights of the party whose costs are being 
taxed". 
I.H. Jacob (ed.) The Supreme Court Practice 1979, Vol. 1. 
(Sweet and Maxwell, London 1979). The principles of 
party and party taxation were enunciated in Smith v Buller 
(1875) LR 19 Eq . 475, 11 It is of great importance to litigants 
who are unsuccessful that they should not be oppressed by 
having to pay an excessive amount of costs . The costs 
chargeable under a taxation between party and party are all 
that are necessary to enable the adverse party to co~duct 
the litigation and no more ••• 11 • 
68 Supra n. 4, 283 . 
69section 150 T .C. P . Act 1977 (infra n . 72). 
Ross v No . 2 T.C.P. Appeal Board (1976) 2 NZLR 206 . 
Wellington Club Incorp. v Carson, Wellington City and 
Others (1972) t ZLR 698, 701. 
70 Supra n. 4, 284 . 
71 Idem. 
72 Locke v Avon Motor Lodge Ltd (1973) 5 NZTPA 17,20. 
73section 150(1) T.C.P . Act. 
74
An implicit handsmack for the appellants is evidenced 
in the decision: " ... the appellant committee were well 
aware of the applicant ' s proposals which had been discussed 
••• over a number of years . The appellant had ample 
opportunity• to prepare its evidence well in advance of 
t he hearing of the appeal .•. in making a responsible 
objection to the applicant ' s proposals at first instance , 
we would have expected it to have done so ''. Supra n . 4 , 284 . 
7 5The necessary corollary of this is that there is no 
automatic righ~ to a new hearing before the Tr ibunal : 
there must be grounds for the appeal . 
7 6This i s i mp l icit from the dismissal of p l anning appeals 
where the appeal itself raised no new principle ; all 
r elevent principles and issues available at first instance -
,Royal Forest and Bird decision , supra n . 19 . 
77Mr A. R. Turner ' s interpretation of an appe l a , and its 
function (Chairman of Planning Tribunal) cited in EDS News 
7(1&2) , 5 . 
78whether local authority hearings should be more or less 
formal i s currently a polemic issue . 
7 9Although the Tribunal, of its own volition , may call 
evidence which the pa~ties to the appeal may cross examine 
- s . 149(3 ) ( 4) T . C . P . Act 1977 . 
80By comparison , under T . C . P . regulations promulgated under 
the 1953 Act , it was a mandatory requirement that the council : 
1. When hearing objections , keep a record of the "substance 
of t he evidence" - reg . 23(4) 1954 Regulations (amended 
in 1960 to include a record of the arguments received -
reg . 21(3) 1960 Regulations) . 
2 . Furnish the Appeal Board with a copy of that record , on 
appeal - reg . 27 (1) (a) 1954 Regulations . 
81
Wellington Club Incorp . (supr a n . 68 , 702 ) per Woodhouse , 
J : " Indeed it needs to be recognised that the fi r s t hear i ng 
i n any conventional sense is the hearing before the Board 
(Tribuna l ) " • 
• 
82 
Report 3, 1970 , para . 85 . 
83 Supra n . 2 . 
84As adopted in both New Zealand and Australian decisions . 
I n Free andAnotherv Takapuna Borough Council (No 2) (1958) 
l NZTPA 69 regarding an appeal under the Municipal Corperation 
Act 1954 , against council approval of a subdivision plan,' 
the Board dismissed the appeal , and held : " .•• as the 
point is a novel one , and of importance to all municipal 
authorities the Board is not disposed to mulct the appellants 
i n costs and .•• makes no order .•• ". 
Sugarman J . in Jansen v Cumbe -land County Council (1952) 
18 LGR 167 , 162 equally declined a costs award , the case 
being in the position of a test case " ..• the general rule 
t hat costs follow the event should be regarded as prima 
facie to be applied , unless there is something in the nature 
of the jur isdiction of the circumstance of the particular 
case which suggests that the application of so~e other 
pri nciple would be more just" . 
85Resort to the Tribunal, in an attempt to discover whether 
in practice a rule of thumb , or informa l recourse to a scale 
of any kind guided cost awards , did little to clarify the 
present obscurity . It was reiterated that cost awards are 
discretionary , the Tribunal in each case guided solely by 
what it considers "reasonable" . Reference to the Code of 
Civil Procedure in the Woolworths decision was felt to be 
an isolated case . 
86 Refer supra n . 49 . 
8 7
A review of Tr ibunal dec i sions il lustrates the fol l owing 
factors as being germane to a cost awar d at the appel l a t e 
l evel : 
1. Evi denc,e : 
(a) I f no evidence is ra i sed , the costs sanct i on will 
be i nvoked - Wellington Regional Progressive 
Association supra n . 15 . 
(b) Treating the local authority hearing as a " dummy 
run ", and adducing furthe r evidence on appea l wi ll 
r esult i n costs - Remarkables supr a n . 4 . 
(c) Failing to concede facts the Tribunal felt should 
h ave bee n conceded will d r aw a costs awar d -
pract ice note . 
2 . Pri ncip l es of Law : 
(a) If no n e w principle is r aised on appeal , costs 
will r e su lt - Shaw supra n . 13 . 
(b) I f sole l y a value judgmen~ is required , the 
costs sanction will be invoked - Royal Forest 
a nd Bird supra n . 19 . 
88RR 5 55 and 556 (et seq . ) . Code of Civil Procedure (q . v .) 
d o i mpose ascertainable restrictions on the power to 
award costs . The rules require that costs in civil 
p r oceedings follow the event , unless there are good reasons 
to the cont r ary . 
89Third sch . Table C Code of Civil Procedure . 
90sect i on 148 T . C . P . Act 1977 , 
9 1 In Woolworths v Dunedin City Council (supra n . 2 ) the 
Tribunal , in exercising its discretion , considered it 
r easonable to refer to the Code of Civil Procedure in 
determining its cost award . 
Note however the Tribunal ' s suggestion that such reference 
was an isolated case - supra n . 8 4 . 
S i milarly in.Ministry of Works a n d Devel opment v Sta ckwood 
(1980) NZ Recent Law 368, 369 where the High Court upheld 
a costs award based on the Supreme Court scale , considering 
the Fees Regulations for witnesses to be a reasonable basis 
for the award of witnesses ' expenses . 
92
N.Z. Parliamentary Debates Vol . 413 , 1977, 2409 : 
introducing the T.C.P. Bill. 
93s t· ec ion 2 ( 3) : Persons with objection rights under the 
Act: 
(a) The Minister . 
(b) Any united or regional council , Regional 
P l anning Authority or local authority having 
jurisdiction in or adjacent to the area to 
which the district ... scheme or application 
relates. 
(c) Any body or person affected . 
(d) Any body or person representing some relevant 
aspect of the public interest. 
94For example, despite the perceived merits of its case , 
the Protection Committee ' s failure to comply with a practice 
note (requiring the production of evidence briefs no less 
than seven days in advance of the appeal hearing) was held 
reprehensible, and dictated a punitive costs award . The 
Tribunal railing against the appellant" by reason of 
the way in which it conducted its case ." 
95The intention that " •.. environmental considerations ~hould 
be brought directly into the planning process ... " and given 
more emphasis, and that the Tribunal 11 ••• fulfil a very 
important role in environmental planning under the new Act 
(the Hon . W. L . Young introducing and conducting the second 
reading of the 1977 T . C . P . Bill, respectively at N. Z . 
Parliamentary Debates Vol . 413 , 1977: 2408 and Vol . 416, 
1977: 5223) is reflected ins. 3(1) (a) of the Act . Section 
3(1), defining matters of national importance as including 
II 
(a) the conservation protection and enhancement of the 
physical ... environment, prescribes their recognition 
·and implementation in regional , district and maritime 
schemes . 
96
The Tribunal's desire that local body hearings be as 
full as possible (without recognition of the inherent 
bias of local authority decisions) , its own preoccupation 
with administration and procedure, and the requirement, in 
practice , that the environmental detriment be proven 
essentially preclude its own objective balancing and 
consideration of environmental factors . 
97
N. Z . Parliamentary Debates , Vol . 416, 1977 : 5223 -
second reading . 
98 
Federated Farmers Ltd v Ashburton County (1976) 
Butterworths Current Law 14~ 
99 
EDS v T . C . P . Appeal Board (1977) 6 NZTPA 353 . 
lOOThe right to participate arises from : 
1 . An individual's desire to be informed, consulted 
and express his views on matters whi2h affect him, both 
personally and collectively . 
2 . The failure of past plans or policies to correctly 
identify the desires of the public . M. S . Nyein "Public 
Participation in Environmental Decision Making" LLB (Hons) 
Legal Writing Paper , Victoria University of Wellington, 
1979 , p . l. 
lOl,, Environmental quality has been promoted through the 
exercise of rights of objection to, and appeal against the 
scheme itself , and through objections and appeals by third 
parties against specific applications .•• " . 
A . R . Turner (Tribunal Chairman) "Planning for Environmental 
Quality" (1975) NZLJ 639. 
102
oECD Report Environmental Policies in New Zealand 
p 36 (Paris , 1981) . 
l0 3Ibid , p '2.7 . 
104The local authority essentially adjudicates on questions 
where its self interest is inexplicably entwined . Notably 
with large scale development proposals , more immediate 
concern with the local t~x base and promotion of local 
economic growth , rather than the higher and abstract 
perceptions of environmental quality , results in an increased 
receptiv i ty to the development cause . 
105sect i on 131 T . C . P . Act 19 77. 
106current Tribunal membership 
(gleaned from Justice Department records) 
No . 1 Di v i s i on 
A. R. Turner (Chairman) 
J . Shaw 
G. R. Tutt 
R. E . Hermans 
No . 2 Division 
W. J . M. Treadwell 
R . S . Martin 
J . F . McKenzie 
H. L . Riley 
No . 3 Division 
P . R. Skelton 
G. J . Broker 
Prior occuoation 
Stipendiary magistrate -
lawyer 
Town Clerk 
Di strict Commissioner of Works 
Stipendiary magistrate -
lawyer 
Rear Admiral - Chief of Naval 
Staff 
Counties Association member and 
county councillor 
Stipendiary magistrate -
lawyer 
G. W. Enson 
R .A. McLennan 
No . 4 Divi s ion 
D. T . J . sh'eppard 
B. Byrnes 
R .A. Catchpole 
K. A. Earles 
County engineer 
Civil engineer; regional 
authority member 
Stipendiary magistrate -
lawyer 
Town Clerk 
Registered surveyor 
County c lerk 
107
sir Guy Powles "E nvironmental Control : The Rights of 
the Individua l Citizen " (1 970) NZLJ 469 , 470 . 
108EDS v National w. s . c . Authority (1976) 6 NZTPA 49 . 
Ministry of Works and Development v National W.S. C. Authority 
and Kear n (1981) New Zealand Recent Law 156 . 
109 (1971) 4 NZTPA 59 . 
110 Supra n . 19. 
111Id em . 
11 2rn the above decision, the Tribunal went on to presume 
an unmet demand fo r electricity, hence outweighing the 
wildlife and recreational interests involved . 
113T. Bl ack "Defending the Environment " (1978) NZLJ 153 . 
11 4J . E . Krier "Environmental Litigation and the Burden of 
Proof" i n Baldwin , M, and Page , J . K. Law and the Environment , 
p 105 , 107 (Walker , New York , 1970) . 
115rt is not the purpose of this pape r to analyse viable 
financial alternatives , since any such proposals represent 
potential sources of funding, and hence are no 
panacea to present environmental appellants pursuing 
a planning appeal, and wishing to avoid a calamitous 
costs award if unsuccessful . 
may prove instructive. 
However , a brief survey 
1. Development of a scale of fees (as some measure 
of certainty). 
2. Widening of cost exceptions under the practice note . 
3. Legal aid , under Legal Aid Act 1969 . 
4. Public appeals . 
5. Acceptance of some costs liability by the initiator 
of a planning proposal (as part of the price of development) . 
6 . Environmental trust . 
7. Private funding, on lines similar to the Ford Foundation 
in the United States . 
8. "Costs follow the event" practice in planning appeals 
(the possibility of receiving costs upon success balancing 
the inhibitive costs liability upon failure) . 
9. Central government funding of environmental appeals . 
10. Legislative intervention. 
116Reflecting the application of s . 148, and exercising 
the "jointly and severally" discretion in Freemans Bay 
Community Committee v Auckland City (1979) B 1456 . 
117 (1980) 7 NZTPA 132 . 
ll 8 (1978) 6 NZTPA 139. 
119 rn Maine v Christchurch City Corporatio~ (1981) 7 NZTPA 
92, the issues raised in an appeal against a grant of 
conditional use consent had become largely academic, the 
result of a scheme change. Apart from the fact of the 
appellant being legally aided, the High Court would have 
awarded $500 and $250 costs in favour of the second and 
first respondents respectively . 
120
smith and others, EDS Inc . and Natural Gas Corp . (NGC) 
v Waimate West County Council 
EDS Inc and NGC v Taranaki Catchment Committee and Regional 
Water Board a~d NGC (1981) 7 NZTPA 241 . 
121
In Kapuni, the Planning Tribunal were disposed to 
award substantial costs against EDS (acting in the public 
interest), despite its success on the sole issue pursued . 
By comparison, those appellants protecting a proprietary 
interest ( a self interest motivation that the Tribunal 
regarded as fully justified) warranted no cost award , yet 
their appeal only achieving" .•• some degree of success ..• ". 
Ibid, 268. 
A Cost claims and awards Costs claimed Costs awarded 
(i) For the Protection 
Committee 
(ii) Against the Protection 
Committee 
Lake County Council 
Mount Cook Group 
Costs incurred in applicant's 
unsuccessful challenge to the 
appellant's standing 
Expert witness costs 
Legal Costs 
Expert witness costs 
Legal Costs 
Helicopter Hire 
TOTAL 
1,101.65 
8,547.53 
9,649.18 
20,868.00 
10,521.43 
300.00 
31,689.43 
$41,338.61 
B Total costs liability of Remarkables Committee 
(i) Conducting its own case 
(ii) Costs awarded against 
(iii) Costs awarded in favour 
19,000 
8 ,500 
$27,500 
Rejected 
-500. GG 
3,000.00 
3,500.00 
2,500.00 
2,500.00 
5,000.00 
$8,500.00 
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